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* FOOD LION AS REFORM OR REVOLUTION: "PUBLICATION
DAMAGES" AND FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
Susan M Gilles*
I. INTRODUCTION
Media litigation' has gone through four phases.' In the first phase,
plaintiffs sued for libel. Libel was traditionally a very plaintiff-friendly
road to recovery--one of the most plaintiff-friendly in all of tort law.
The libel plaintiff needed only to prove publication of a statement "of
or concerning" her which would diminish her reputation.3 No proof of
fault, no proof of falsity, and no proof of damages were required.4
Against this backdrop, the impact of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' and
its progeny cannot be over-emphasized: plaintiffs went from no-fault
to, in most cases, perhaps the highest standard of fault in all tort law
(clear and convincing evidence of actual malice).6 In addition, plaintiffs
* Professor of Law, Capital University Law School; LL.B. (Hons.), University
of Glasgow; LL.M., Harvard Law School. The author would like to thank Dean
Rodney K. Smith, Professor Richard J. Peltz, and the members of the University of
Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review for so graciously hosting this timely symposium;
my colleagues Professor Dan Kobil and Professor Mark Strasser for their insightful
comments; and Diane Brody for her able research assistance.
1. This paper discusses suits against the media. It does not address non-media
defendants.
2. I do not want to suggest that this is a strictly historical account. Plaintiffs have
always filed a variety of suits against the media. However, certain trends in litigation
can be observed. Others have noted a trend away from the traditional libel action. See,
e.g., Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock a Right: Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta that Bar
First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1135, 1137-38 (1997)
(reporting that plaintiffs have resorted to suits based on the media's actions in gathering
the news to avoid the constitutional limits of the First Amendment); David A. Logan,
Masked Media: Judges. Juries and the Law of Surreptitious Newsgathering, 83 IOWA L. REV.
161, 167-68 (1997) (noting that plaintiffs began pleading multiple tort theories in an
effort to evade the First Amendment protection imposed by the Court); Charles G.
Scheim, Comment, Trash Tort or Trash TV?: Food Lion, Inc., v. ABC, Inc., and Tort
Liability ofthe Media for Newsgathering, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 185, 187-88 (1998) (noting
a change in legal tactics by plaintiffs); Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First
Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1097, 1103 (1999) (noting an
increasing number of highly visible cases brought for intrusion).
3. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1120 (2000).
4. See id.
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. See id. at 285-86.
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now had to prove falsity7 and, in many cases, actual damages.' Even if
plaintiffs surmounted this initial barrier, they were faced with a second
hurdle-a very stringent standard of appellate review.9 The libel route
no longer looked attractive, and may have become impassable.
The reaction of the plaintiffs' bar was to pursue other routes to
recovery. Cases that originally would have been framed as libel actions
now appeared in other guises. This began the second era of media
litigation, as plaintiffs turned to other speech torts, such as false light or
publication of private facts. These cases are similar to the classic libel
case in two ways. First, like libel, the plaintiff seeks to recover for a
publication (one which places her in a false light or reveals private
details of her life). Second, as in libel, these torts are designed to punish
"wrongful" publication-by definition the plaintiff is seeking damages
because of the defendant's speech. When the United States Supreme
Court considered these cases, it extended protections, identical or
parallel to those recognized in New York Times, and once again made
recovery difficult or impossible.'"
Media law then entered a third phase-plaintiffs sought to use tort
actions that had nothing to do with publication as a vehicle for recovery
against media defendants." Plaintiffs continued to sue because of a
publication, but they used tort actions which were not designed to
punish speech, for example, cases sounding in negligence, products
liability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The classic
illustration is Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,'2 where the Reverend
7. See id. at 279-80 (holding that a public official must prove falsity or reckless
disregard). See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69
(1986) (holding that private figures must also prove falsity on suits over matters of
public concern).
8. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,350 (1974) (holding that private
figures may only collect actual damages unless they prove actual malice); cf Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985) (holding that
presumed damages are permissible where the plaintiff is a private figure and the matter
is one of private concern).
9. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,510-
11 (1984); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 284-86.
10. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding that First Amendment
concerns precluded recovery where a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information
about a matter of public significance); Cox Broad. Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)
(recognizing some First Amendment limitations in publication of private fact actions);
Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245,251-52 (1974) (applying actual malice
to the false light tort when brought by a public figure); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
389-90 (1967) (holding the New York Times version of false light was subject to actual
malice requirement).
11. For similar observations by other authors, see supra, note 2.
12. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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Jerry Falwell sued Hustler Magazine for intentional infliction of
emotional distress because it published a parody portraying him as
engaged in drunken and incestuous behavior. This claim resembled the
traditional libel case in that it sought damages for a publication, but it
used a tort-intentional infliction of emotional distress-which was not
created to punish a wrongful publication, but rather to be used against
any behavior which intentionally inflicts emotional distress. 3 While the
Court extended the protections of New York Times in the Hustler case,'4
as discussed later, the Court's position is by no means clear, and it took
a seemingly conflicting position a few years later in Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co. 5
In the fourth and final era, plaintiffs moved away from publication,
and instead sought to recover for torts committed by the media while
gathering news. 6 Actions for trespass, breach of duty of loyalty, fraud, 7
13. 1 will use the phrase "traditional speech torts" to define torts, like libel, where
the plaintiff sues because of a publication and the tort action itself is designed to
penalize wrongful speech. In these torts, speech is an essential element of the
plaintiff's claim and, by definition, the plaintiff seeks damages because of speech.
In distinction, by "non-speech torts," I mean those in which speech is not a
necessary element. These include both the newsgathering cases (where the complaint
is about the media's conduct in gathering the news) and cases where the action focuses
on a publication but uses a tort which does not necessarily focus on speech. Examples
of the latter include negligence, products liability, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. To illustrate, a libel action is a speech tort: it always seeks
damages because of the defendant's speech-it requires a "publication." In contrast,
a products liability action can be founded on acup of coffee, a car, or a book. See, e.g.,
Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 U.S. 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (dismissing claims
based on incitement, negligence, products liability, dangerous instrumentality, and
attractive nuisance filed when 14 year old died of asphyxia after reading a Hustler
article on autoerotic asphyxia). While the Court has been clear that some form of First
Amendment protection extends to traditional speech torts, it is confused as to when, if
ever, the First Amendment applies to torts which are not designed to punish
publication.
Others have used the terms "speech tort" differently. For example, Anderson
uses the phrase "speech torts" to cover any tort used to sue for speech even if speech
is not an element of the tort. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Torts, Speech, and Contracts,
75 TEx. L. REv. 1499, 1499-50 (1997).
14. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
15. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
16. 1 will use the phrase "newsgathering torts" to describe tort actions based on the
media's conduct while gathering the news.
17. Fraud is a hard tort to classify. Fraud (or fraudulent misrepresentation) usually
involves speech by the defendant to the plaintiff, since it requires a representation. See
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 736 (5th
ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) (noting that while the representation "usually consists. . . of
oral or written words.., it is not necessarily so limited"). I think, however, that fraud
probably is best seen as a non-speech tort because it does not require speech to a third
party (i.e., "publication") in the way that the traditional speech torts, like libel, false
2000]
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and even statutorily-created actions became the routes of choice. These
actions not only do not use traditional speech torts, but also do not even
purport to complain about publication. Rather, these claims focus on
the media's conduct while gathering news. This article discusses these
newsgathering torts and, in particular, the latest "poster child" of this
trend, the case of Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., recently
decided by the Fourth Circuit.
On November 5, 1992, ABC broadcast a segment on its PrimeTime
Live show alleging unwholesome food handling practices at Food Lion
stores (a broadcast which contained footage shot by undercover
reporters who had obtained employment using fictitious resumes).'9
Food Lion sued for fraud, breach of the employees' duty of loyalty,
trespass, and unfair trade practices. 2 At trial, the jury found for the
plaintiff on all the counts before it." It awarded Food Lion $1,400 on
the fraud claim and $1,500 on the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA)
claim (the trial court later required Food Lion to elect between the two,
and Food Lion elected fraud).22 The jury awarded nominal damages of
only one dollar each on the trespass and breach of duty of loyalty claims
because Food Lion conceded at trial that it could not quantify actual
damages on these counts.23 However, a week later the jury awarded
over $5.5 million in punitives based on the fraud claim, which the trial
judge reduced to $315,000 after post-trial motions.24 Thus, as appealed,
the award was $1,402 in compensatory damages (for fraud, UTPA,
trespass and breach of duty of loyalty) and $315,000 in punitives"
The Fourth Circuit held that Food Lion, as a matter of state law, had
not proven a claim for fraud or a claim under the UTPA.26 It therefore
reversed the "lion's share" of the compensatory damages ($1,400), and
reversed the award of punitive damages since they were based on the
fraud claim." The Court of Appeals then considered the claims of
light, and publication of private facts do.
18. 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
19. See id. at 510-11.
20. See id. In fact, Food Lion filed fourteen claims of wrongdoing. See Logan,
supra note 2, at 18 1-88 (discussing details of the claims and their disposition).
21. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 511.
22. See id.
23. See id. at511,515n.3.
24. Seeid. at 511.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 512, 520.
27. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 512, 522. The Fourth Circuit's ruling confirms
Professor Logan's position that the common law can be an effective tool to protect the
media in newsgathering cases. See Logan, supra note 2, at 192. 1 agree that the
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trespass and breach of duty of loyalty.2" First, it held both claims were
supported by state law.29 Turning to the media's argument that the First
Amendment barred recovery, the court then held that the First Amend-
ment did not alter the common law rules on liability for such torts." It
thus upheld the one dollar nominal damage awards on both counts."'
The actual damages awarded by the jury were so low in this case
because the trial court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover
the damages flowing from the publication32 (estimated by Food Lion to
be in the billions of dollars).33 On appeal, this limitation on damages
was upheld. The Fourth Circuit ruled that the Constitution precluded
recovery, absent a showing of actual malice and falsity.34 Thus, the
Food Lion court deals with the First Amendment twice: first it asked
whether the First Amendment precludes liability, and concluded it does
not;35 then it returned to the separate question of whether the First
Amendment precludes the plaintiff from recovering "publication
damages," and concluded it does.36
FoodLion was a pyrrhic victory for the plaintiff. The pro-plaintiff
verdicts on trespass and breach of duty of loyalty were upheld, but, as
affirmed, the plaintiff's judgment was for two dollars in compensatory
damages and no punitives. The Constitution was held not to bar the
common law may sometimes be an effective safeguard, but disagree that state law
provides a sufficient guarantee of protection to make First Amendment limitations
unneeded.
28. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 515-19 (discussing breach of duty of loyalty and
trespass).
29. See id.
30. See id. at 520-22.
31. See id. at 522.
32. See id. at 522. The trial court initially in its pretrial ruling based this limitation
on damages on the First Amendment, see Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
887 F. Supp. 811, 822-23 (M.D.N.C. 1995), but its final post-trial ruling on the
damages issue was based on proximate cause, see Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 965 (M.D.N.C. 1997). On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit bypassed the proximate cause issue and upheld the denial of publication
damages on First Amendment grounds, noting: "We do not reach the matter of
proximate cause because an overriding (and settled) First Amendment principle
precludes the award of publication damages in this case .... " Food Lion, 194 F.3d at
522.
33. In pleadings, Food Lion estimated its damages from the publication to be 5.5
billion dollars. See Logan, supra note 2, at 181 n.140. These damages allegedly
stemmed from a dramatic drop in retail sales, the fall in the value of its publicly traded
securities, and the forced-closure of 88 stores (with resulting layoffs). Id. at 181 (citing
various sources).
34. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522-24.
35. See id. at 520-22.
36. See id. at 522-24.
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plaintiff's claims, but was held to bar recovery of any significant
damages.
This essay discusses the Fourth Circuit's opinion in FoodLion and
its effort to deal with the Supreme Court's conflicting decisions in
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co." and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.38  As
a prelude, it helps to separate two questions, which are often conflated:
first, when should First Amendment scrutiny be triggered? Second,
what limits-substantive, procedural and/or remedial-should the
Constitution then impose? Let us briefly look at the latter, then turn to
what this author considers the more interesting issue, namely, what
triggers First Amendment scrutiny.
II. THE THREE-PRONGED APPROACH OFNEW YORK TIMES: WHAT
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS MAKE SENSE?
As this author has argued elsewhere,39 New York Times is a multi-
dimensional case. The Court there held that the First Amendment
imposed three distinct restrictions on recovery-substantive, procedural
and remedial. Thus, New York Times altered the substantive law of libel
(requiring plaintiffs to prove two new elements: fault and falsity);40 it
altered the procedural path of libel law (switching the burden of proving
falsity and fault to the plaintiff, heightening the level of proof to clear
and convincing, and creating a searching standard of appellate review);4'
and finally, in Gertz, it altered the remedy available by limiting
damages.42
Most of the debate has concerned which, if any, of these three
constitutionally-driven reforms should apply when plaintiffs sue for
newsgathering torts.43 I will briefly review the three options in light of
the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Food Lion.
37. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
38. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
39. See Susan M. Gilles, Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An Analysis
of Process in Libel Litigation, 58 OHiO ST. L.J. 1753 (1998).
40. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
41. See id. at 279-80 (discussing burden on plaintiff), at 285-86 (holding that proof
must be with "convincing clarity"), at 284-87 (establishing an independent standard of
appellate review).
42. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
43. 1 will focus on the three types of constitutional restrictions which flow from
New York Times. For a pithy review of the various First Amendment standards drawn
from throughout the Court's First Amendmentjurisprudence, see Anderson, supra note
13, at 1499, 1508-10.
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A. The Transplantation of the Substantive Requirements of New
York Times
One option is to apply the substantive requirements announced in
New York Times (that a libel plaintiff must prove falsity and some degree
of fault) to all torts." This seemed a popular response early on. Thus
in Time, Inc.," and Cantrell," and then when confronted with the tort of
false light, the Supreme Court simply transplanted actual malice and
falsity into these torts.
Although the Court bristled at the accusation that it had simply
engaged in "blind application" of the New York Times standard,47 the
Court provided little analysis on when or why the substantive restric-
tions of New York Times would apply. Indeed, even as plaintiffs began
to use other traditional speech torts, the Court, despite urging from the
media, wavered on whether to adopt the substantive strictures that New
York Times had imposed in libel actions. For instance, when confronted
with claims based in privacy (most prominently for the publication of
private facts), the Court rejected the analogy to libel, although it did, on
a case by case basis, fashion a First Amendment limit on recovery.48
With a third wave of torts to hit the lower courts (those based on
publication but abandoning the traditional speech torts in favor of
actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, or
promissory estoppel), the Court issued seemingly conflicting decisions
44. See supra notes 6 & 7. The most sophisticated version of this solution is
Easton's, supra note 2, at 1135. Professor Easton proposes that the actual malice
standard be modified to "bad faith" or "outrageous behavior," and then applied to limit
liability for newsgathering torts.
45. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (holding false light was subject to
the actual malice requirement).
46. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245,251-52 (1972) (applying
actual malice to the false light tort when brought by a public figure).
47. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
48. For instance, in Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,489-90 (1975), the
Court recognized that "in defamation actions" the message of New York Times required
proof of falsity and actual malice, but refused to require that truth be recognized as
defense to every privacy action. Instead, it announced a narrower rule-that the State
could not impose sanctions for the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim
obtained from a public record. See Cox, 420 U.S. at 49-90. See also Florida Star v.




on whether the restrictions of New York Times would apply.4 9 In Hustler,
the Court said that they did, but in Cohen, said they did not.50
The difficulty is even more pronounced when the suit focuses on
the media's activities in gathering the news. The "simple solution" of
adding actual malice and falsity to the elements of the tort seems
nonsensical. Because "publication" is not the focus of these
newsgathering torts, how can a requirement that the publication be made
with actual malice and be false make any sense? To illustrate, if the
media is sued for trespass (the intentional entry on to the land of another
without permission), as it was in Food Lion, how can we ask if the
media's trespass is "false" or with "actual malice"?5
The lower courts faced with this quandary have often simply
rejected the analogy to libel. Thus the FoodLion court, in upholding the
pro-plaintiff verdicts for trespass and breach of duty of loyalty, rejected
the idea that plaintiffs must prove fault and falsity to state a claim.52
Liability for newsgathering torts did not depend on the plaintiff meeting
the substantive strictures of New York Times." In sum, while the early
response to plaintiffs' use of torts other than libel was to import the
substantive requirements of New York Times (fault and falsity), the court
of appeals in Food Lion shied away from this approach when facing
newsgathering torts.
B. Procedural Requirements of New York Times
Another reaction to the use of newsgathering torts against the media
has been to transfer, not the substantive requirements of New York Times,
but its procedural protections." Of most significance is the adoption of
the doctrine of independent appellate review. Suggested in New York
49. See, e.g., Hustler, 485 U.S. at 56 (1988) (adding actual malice to a public
figure's burden of proof in intentional infliction of emotional distress cases); cf. Cohen,
501 U.S. at 665-67.
50. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
51. Cf Easton, supra note 2, at 1135 (proposing that the actual malice standard be
modified to "bad faith" or "outrageous behavior").
52. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 520-22 (rejecting a defense argument that the First
Amendment limited liability for the torts of trespass and breach of duty of loyalty).
53. See id. In another recent case, Veilleux v. NBC Co., 206 F.3d 92 (1 st Cir. 2000),
the First Circuit held that the First Amendment imposes substantive limitations; rather
than applying the standards of New York Times, it rejected a claim of misrepresentation,
citing in part the "constitutional prohibition of vagueness" which it found to be "well
established" in "the realm of defamation." Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 122.
54. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 15 10 (noting that use of procedural limits is the
"most potent of all the techniques" available to courts).
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Times," and spelled out two decades later in Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., this doctrine requires appellate courts to
independently review the record to ascertain if First Amendment
requirements have been met." While standards of review often seem a
mere shibboleth, New York Times' independent appellate review
requirement has proved a near impenetrable shield for libel defendants.
One study reported that seventy percent of defense appeals see pro-
plaintiff trial verdicts reversed, remanded, or modified." Some lower
courts have applied this procedural requirement, a stringent standard of
appellate review, beyond libel cases. 9
This issue did not arise in FoodLion, presumably because the court
saw the issues before it as involving only "questions of... law."6° It,
therefore, applied a de novo standard of review to the questions of law
6'
and had no need to consider whether the Bose standard would apply to
review of the facts or the application of law to facts. However, some
lower courts have applied the Bose standard not just to libel, but to a
wide range of actions against the media. For example, in Veilleux, a
recent First Circuit opinion, the court of appeals noted that "this court,
like other courts of appeal, has extended the independent review rule
well beyond defamation claims,"'62 and then applied the heightened
standard to plaintiffs' misrepresentation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and privacy claims.63 This approach is so flexible
because, unlike the substantive reforms of New York Times which are
wedded to its requirement of publication, procedural reforms can be
applied in any case where First Amendment issues are at stake.'
55. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 284-86.
56. 466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984).
57. For a discussion of the scope of independent review, see Gilles, supra note 39,
at 1772 nn.70-71 (1998).
58. See id. at 1776-79 (reviewing studies of reversal rates under Bose).
59. See id. at 1772 n.70 (citing a series of cases applying Bose outside the libel
area).
60. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 512.
61. See id.
62. Veilleux v. NBC Co., 206 F.3d 92, 106 (1st Cir. 2000).
63. See id. at 107.
64. Indeed, courts have applied independent review in a wide variety of settings.
See Gilles, supra note 40, at 1722 n.70 (discussing the application of independent
review outside the libel area).
2000]
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C. Damages Limitations of New York Times
A third possibility is to impose a First Amendment limit on the
damages a plaintiff may recover.65 In New York Times itself, the Supreme
Court noted the record level of damages awarded by thejury and posited
that such awards would silence debate," although it did not specifically
announce any limitation on damage awards in libel cases. However, in
Gertz, the Court, led by Justice Powell, directly addressed damages,
holding that only actual damages could be recovered unless the plaintiff
proved actual malice. Thus, in libel suits on matters of public concern,
presumed or punitive damages are unavailable unless the plaintiffmakes
a heightened showing of fault." Under this approach, the First
Amendment limits the remedy: certain types of damages (usually
presumed and punitive damages) are prohibited unless a heightened
showing is made. Thus we can conceive of a First Amendment
restriction, not in terms of process or substantive law, but in terms of a
constitutionally mandated limitation on damages.6 9
The court of appeals in FoodLion focused on damages.7 ° Although
it upheld the pro-plaintiff verdicts on trespass and breach of duty of
loyalty, it ruled that the Constitution severely limited the damages
which the plaintiff could recover. According to the FoodLion court, the
plaintiff "could not bypass the New York Times standard if it wanted
publication damages."'" Thus one way to view this opinion is that it
65. For a detailed proposal of how such a First Amendment damage limitation
could work in newsgathering cases, see Andrew B. Sims, Food for the Lions: Excessive
Damages for Newsgathering Torts and the Limitations of Current First Amendment Doctrines,
78 B.U. L. REV. 507, 530 (1998). An interesting alternate approach is to use the
common law to limit damages. See Logan, supra note 2, at 192 et seq. (arguing that
common law offers a more flexible and nuanced alternative to First Amendment limits
and setting out proposed limitations on damages in newsgathering cases).
66. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 294-95 (Black, J., concurring).
67. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350 (holdingthat private figures may only collect actual
damages unless they prove actual malice); cf Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (permitting presumed damages where the plaintiff
is a private figure and the matter is one of private concern).
68. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
69. Moreover, the Court has now announced that even where the First Amendment
is not implicated, the Fourteenth Amendment limits the award of punitive damages.
See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996).
70. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522-24.
71. Id. at 524. This idea was expressly adopted by the First Circuit in the Veilleux
decision. Citing Food Lion, the Veileux court held that "the type of damages sought
bears on the necessity of constitutional safeguards." Veilleux, 206 F.3d at 127-28. Both
courts of appeal concluded that an attempt to recover "defamation-type damages"
without satisfying New York Times was barred by Supreme Court precedent. See id. at
[Vol. 23
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advocates that the First Amendment restrictions on damages recognized
in Gertz be applied to tort actions against the media for their activities
in gathering the news. While Gertz focused on presumed and punitive
damages, the Food Lion court took aim at reputational and emotional
distress damages. 2 Such an approach is appealing, and as some authors
have suggested, it may be that constitutionally mandated damage
limitations are the most effective legacy of New York Times."3
However, what is interesting about the FoodLion court's discussion
of damages is not that it recognized that the Constitution may mandate
a limit on damages, but rather that it applied these First Amendment
limits to torts committed while gathering the news. Why does the court
think that newsgathering torts even trigger First Amendment scrutiny?
The innovation of FoodLion, thus, is not about the type of protection we
should impose, but about when First Amendment protections are
triggered. Food Lion uses damages as the trigger for First Amendment
scrutiny.
Ill. THE TRIGGER
When should First Amendment scrutiny apply to limit a plaintiff's
recovery? The fascinating answer offered by Food Lion is that First
Amendment scrutiny is not triggered simply because plaintiff sues and
recovers for newsgathering torts, but is triggered when the plaintiff
requests publication damages flowing from those very same torts.
7 4
Why?
First, let us look at a couple of triggers the Food Lion court
considered and rejected (the identity of the defendant and newsgathering
activity), and then we will examine two possible interpretations of the
more sophisticated trigger designed by the Food Lion court.
128; Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522-24.
72. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522-24.
73. See, e.g., Sims, supra note 65, at 530 (proposing that in newsgathering cases no
reputational damages and no punitives be allowed unless certain First Amendment
prerequisites are met, and that actual damages only be allowed based on "competent
evidence").
74. As we have already discussed, an equally important question is what First
Amendment protections should look like when triggered. See Anderson, supra note 13,
at 1508-10 (reviewing varying First Amendment standards utilized in speech cases).
The Fourth Circuit presumes that it looks like a prohibition of certain damages unless
the New York Times's actual malice standard is met. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522-24.
1 will use the phrase "First Amendment scrutiny" to denote some form of heightened
protection, be it the substantive, remedial or procedural protections of New York Times
(discussed previously), or some other form of First Amendment scrutiny.
2000]
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A. The Identity of the Defendant as Trigger: Immunity for the
Media?
Obviously, the fact that the media is a defendant (even if we could
define who "the media" is) should not always trigger First Amendment
safeguards. For instance, if you are flattened crossing the road by aNew
York Times delivery truck, no one contends that your negligence lawsuit
should be subjected to additional First Amendment requirements (be
they substantive, procedural, or remedial) simply because the New York
Times is a defendant. While such defendant-based protections are not
unknown to the law, the principal example being the immunity granted
the government as defendant, no one has advocated that the First
Amendment grant similar immunity to the media.75 Noting the strength
of this authority, the Food Lion court joined the chorus and reiterated
that "the media have no general immunity from tort or contract liabil-
ity.976
B. Protection for All Newsgathering Activities?
Another option would be to hold that newsgathering is a protected
activity: whenever the media is engaged in newsgathering, First
Amendment limitations (of some variety) would apply. While this
solution has been favored by many academics," it has not found favor
with the United States Supreme Court7" and seems unlikely to do so."'
Once again, the Food Lion court, while acknowledging the conflicting
dicta, rejected the argument that newsgathering activity automatically
triggers First Amendment restrictions.
75. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly noted that the media is not immune from
liability. See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937) (noting that
the "publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general
laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others.").
76. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 520 (quoting Desnick v. American Broad. Cos., Inc.,
44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995)).
77. See, e.g., Easton, supra note 2, at 1135 (advocating a modified actual malice
standard be triggered in all tort suits against the media for newsgathering activities);
Sims, supra note 65, at 507 (advocating that newsgathering activities be granted First
Amendment protection in the form of limitations on damages).
78. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-82 (1972); Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1968).
79. See, e.g., Easton, supra note 2, at 1135 (acknowledging that a general protection
for newsgathering is the "least likely conclusion"); Sims, supra note 65, at 515
(characterizing any media claim to First Amendment immunity for newsgathering as
"dubious").
80. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 520.
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C. The Mystery of Generally Applicable Laws
As the Food Lion court noted, the closest the Supreme Court has
come to explaining when First Amendment protections are triggered
was in Cohen," where the Court evoked the phrase "generally applicable
laws" to describe those laws which did not trigger First Amendment
protection." In Cohen, the Court refused to extend any First Amend-
ment protection when a campaign worker filed a promissory estoppel
action against several newspapers for their reports naming him as the
source of a smear campaign against the opposing candidate.83 The
reporters had promised Cohen anonymity, yet his name was published
in breach of this promise." The Supreme Court held that an action for
promissory estoppel was a "law of general applicability" and thus the
First Amendment limits recognized in its libel and privacy cases were
"not controll[ing]."85 Rather the case was governed by the "equally
well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable laws
do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement
against the press has incidental effects on its-ability to gather and report
the news."' Thus Cohen suggests that the key to whether a cause of
action will trigger First Amendment protection is whether the law is one
of "general applicability." '
The FoodLion court adopted this approach in the liability section of
its opinion and noted that "the key inquiry in [Cohen] was whether
promissory estoppel was a generally applicable law."" ABC argued that
before it could be held liable for trespass or breach of duty of loyalty
arising from newsgathering, First Amendment scrutiny must be
applied. 9 The Fourth Circuit rejected this call for First Amendment
81. See id.
82. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
83. See id. at 665-67.
84. See id. at 666.
85. Id. at 669.
86. Id.
87. See id. For an alternate reading of Cohen, see Logan, supra note 2, at 191
(construing Cohen to apply a two part test: "whether the claim pursued by the plaintiff
arises out of the newsgathering process (as opposed to the content of the publication)
and whether the law imposes an 'incidental burden on the press').
88. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 521. Since the court of appeals held that the plaintiff
had not proven either fraud or unfair trade practices under state law, it only applied its
First Amendment analysis to the remaining claims-breach of duty of loyalty and
trespass. See id. at 514, 520.
89. See id. at 521 ("ABC argues that even if state tort law covers some of [the
reporters'] conduct, the district court erred in refusing to subject Food Lion's claims to
any level of First Amendment scrutiny.").
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scrutiny." Citing Cohen, it concluded that trespass and breach of duty
of loyalty are "law[s] of general applicability," requiring no such
scrutiny.9 What then did the Food Lion court think the nebulous phrase
"laws of general applicability" meant?
1. GeneralApplicability: Causes ofAction Not Targeting the Media?
At first the Food Lion court seemed to read Cohen as holding that
any law which does not single out the media is a law of general
applicability, and is thus immune from First Amendment scrutiny.92
This reading is certainly supported by the language in Cohen. The
Supreme Court in Cohen noted that the promissory estoppel action at
issue there did "not target or single out the press," but was instead
"generally applicable to the daily transactions of all the citizens of
Minnesota."93  The Fourth Circuit in Food Lion picked up on this
language and suggested that actions for breach of the duty of loyalty and
trespass do not trigger First Amendment protection because "[n]either
tort targets or singles out the press. Each applies to the daily transac-
tions of the citizens of North and South Carolina."94 Is this then the test
for First Amendment scrutiny-only actions which single out the media
trigger First Amendment safeguards?
While the Food Lion court flirted with this reading of "generally
applicability," it ultimately rejected it, concluding, I think correctly, that
such a reading is at odds with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence."'
While it is true that a law that singles out or targets the media is subject
to First Amendment scrutiny,' it has never been true that a law is
immune from scrutiny simply because it affects everyone. Indeed, New
York Times itself proves that such an assertion is erroneous.9 7 The action
at stake in New York Times was libel. Libel does not target the media, it
punishes anyone who makes a false statement be they a newspaper or a
90. See id. at 521-22.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 521.
93. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670-71.
94. FoodLion, 194 F.3d at 521.
95. The Food Lion court cites to the conflict with Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S.
560 (1991), where the Supreme Court appeared to apply some form of heightened
scrutiny to a ban on nudity despite the fact that it applied equally to all. See FoodLion,
194 F.3d at 521-22.
.96. For a discussion of this well accepted principle, see Susan M. Gilles, Promises
Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 1,
69(1995).
97. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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member of the public, yet libel law is subject to First Amendment
scrutiny."
2. General Applicability as Conduct?
The Food Lion court then considered a distinction between laws
which target speech and those that target conduct: perhaps "laws of
general applicability" are laws that do not seek to punish speech, but
rather to target conduct." This reading of the phrase "generally
applicable laws" is borne out by most of the examples the Cohen Court
gives at the start of its analysis: laws of general applicability are laws
on breaking and entering into homes and offices, on responding to
subpoenas, on labor law, on antitrust, and on tax."° The Cohen Court
did seem to see promissory estoppel as one more regulation of how the
media does business, which not only does not regulate speech but has
only a minimal impact on newsgathering. "'
The Fourth Circuit in Food Lion seemed to ultimately adopt this
speech-versus-conduct distinction to explain Cohen. Seeking to
distinguish Barnes v. Glen Theatre (which applied First Amendment
scrutiny to a ban on nudity), the FoodLion court stated: "The cases are
consistent, however, if we view the challenged conduct in [Cohen] to be
the breach ofpromise and not some form of expression."" Since the torts
98. See id.
99. The speech/conduct distinction is a familiar one in constitutional law. In the
O 'Brien line of cases, the Court has recognized that conduct, like burning a draft card,
can sometimes be a form of expression. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968). This line of case law seeks to give some degree of protection to expressive
conduct.
The problem in newsgathering is distinct. The conduct at
issue--newsgathering-is not expressive conduct: The ABC reporters did not trespass
to send a message, but to gather information. However, we might still want to subject
a lawsuit based on such conduct to First Amendment scrutiny either because we believe
that newsgathering should be protected, see supra note 77, or, as I will suggest infra,
because we believe that the plaintiff is seeking to collect damages for the resulting
publication (speech), not for the underlying conduct.
100. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669. The one example cited by the Court which could
be seen as targeting speech, not conduct, is copyright. See id. The Cohen Court may
regard this as a regulation of property, not of speech. For a discussion of the Court's
confused treatment of property claims based on speech, see Diane L. Zimmerman,
Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill
of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 665 (1992).
101. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at670-71.
102. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522 (emphasis added). The court continued: "In Glen
Theatre, on the other hand, an activity directly covered by the law, nude dancing,
necessarily involved expression, and heightened scrutiny was applied." Id
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at issue before the Food Lion court (trespass and breach of duty of
loyalty) were based on conduct, not speech, the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that liability could be upheld without meeting the restraints of
New York Times. 1
03
I agree with the Fourth Circuit in Food Lion that the Cohen Court
would have held that claims based on conduct, such as trespass and
breach of duty of loyalty, are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny.
The Cohen Court's dicta, that imposing liability on the media for
breaking and entering does not trigger First Amendment scrutiny, seems
to close the door to any such argument."° Moreover, as the FoodLion
court notes, and we have discussed above, the Court has consistently
rejected claims that newsgathering activities trigger First Amendment
review. ,'
However, I disagree with the Food Lion court that this is all Cohen
held. Cohen in fact is a more complex case than Food Lion. In Food
Lion, the complaint, on its face, was about newsgathering conduct, not
about publication. In contrast, the plaintiff in Cohen complained about
a publication-a newspaper article which included his name as the
source. Although he used a cause of action (promissory estoppel) that
is not a traditional speech tort, the activity he complained of was not
newsgathering, but rather publication of his name. Cohen, therefore,
holds that even when the lawsuit is based on a publication, sometimes
First Amendment protections do not apply." This is an issue which the
Food Lion court did not need to reach, since the question it faced in its
liability section is whether liability for newsgathering conduct is
dependent on meeting the standards set out in New York Times." 7 In
Thus, as one commentator has noted, the Cohen Court views the breach of
promise as conduct, not speech, thus meriting no protection; and the nude dancing in
Glen Theatre as speech (expressive conduct) which does merit First Amendment
scrutiny. See David Bogen, Generally Applicable Laws and the First Amendment, 26 Sw.
U. L. REv. 201, 223-32 (1997). The irony is that in the same year the Court applied
First Amendment scrutiny to dancing in bars, but not to limits on the media's ability
to gather news. See id. The Supreme Court itself has now noted the conflict between
Cohen and Glen Theatre. In Turner, Justice Kennedy summed up the two cases in an
honest, if not very helpful, way: generally applicable laws "may or may not be subject
to heightened scrutiny." Id. at 232 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622 (1994)).
103. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 521, 522.
104. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
105. See supra note 78.
106. It is this broader holding which creates a conflict with Hustler as discussed
below.
1 07. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d. at 520 (phrasing the question before it as whether the
reporter's newsgathering activities are subject to some form of First Amendment
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short, the Food Lion court was correct to conclude that, under Cohen,
liability for conduct (even conduct by the media while gathering the
news) is not dependent on meeting New York Times, but it erred in
implying that such a rule can explain the holding in Cohen.
IV. THE END-RUN TRIGGER
While the FoodLion court rejected the idea that claims based on the
media's newsgathering conduct triggers First Amendment scrutiny, it
held that First Amendment scrutiny was triggered when the plaintiff
sought to recover publication damages flowing from such torts. When,
then, are newsgathering torts subject to First Amendment scrutiny?
Food Lion's answer is that First Amendment scrutiny will be triggered
if the plaintiff is attempting an "end-run" around New York Times.'
The argument goes something like this: at the core of the Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence is its protection of the media from libel
actions. A plaintiff cannot sue for libel unless she meets the First
Amendment's stringent requirements. If the plaintiff is allowed to
circumvent these protections by simply disguising her libel claim as
another tort, then New York Times would be eviscerated. Therefore, if we
detect a disguised libel claim, First Amendment protections will be
triggered. First Amendment scrutiny is required when the plaintiff sues
for a traditional speech tort or when the Court determines that the
plaintiff has elected to sue for a non-speech tort in an effort to circum-
vent New York Times' restrictions. In more parochial terms: the trigger
is a traditional speech tort or evidence of an "end-run."
The idea that evidence of an "end-run" should trigger First
Amendment scrutiny was suggested in Cohen as an explanation of the
seeming conflict between the Court's refusal to grant constitutional
protection in Cohen, when it had extended such protection three years
earlier in Hustler."°9 In Hustler, plaintiff Falwell filed suit for libel and
intentional infliction of distress based on a parody published in Hustler
Magazine portraying him as an incestuous drunkard."' The jury
returned a pro-defense verdict on the libel claim, but a pro-plaintiff
scrutiny.).
108. See id. at 522. Others have called this principle the "anti-circumvention"
theory, echoing the language of Judge Posner in Desnick v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 44
F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995). See, e.g., Sims, supra note 65, at 521.
109. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671.
110. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47-48 (1988). He also
stated a claim for privacy, but this was dismissed by the trial court. See id.
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verdict on intentional infliction of emotional distress claim."' The
Supreme Court applied First Amendment scrutiny and held that the New
York Times restrictions of falsity and actual malice barred recovery for
intentional infliction of emotional distress."' The case seemed to signal
that any tort action based on a publication (even where the tort was not
a traditional speech tort, but rather one where speech was not an
essential element)" 3 would trigger First Amendment protection.
However, three years later in Cohen, when the Court confronted a
claim for promissory estoppel also based on a publication, the Court
held that no First Amendment review was triggered. 4 Both Hustler and
Cohen involved publications, and both used causes of action not
designed to punish speech, yet only Hustler was held to trigger First
Amendment review. One explanation the Cohen Court offered to
account for this seeming conflict, and the idea the Fourth Circuit picked
up on in FoodLion, was that First Amendment scrutiny was triggered in
Hustler because the plaintiff was attempting an "end-run test.""' In
Cohen, the Supreme Court expressly noted that, unlike the plaintiff in
Hustler, Cohen was not attempting to use the promissory estoppel cause
of action "to avoid the strict requirements for establishing a libel or
defamation claim."' 6 It is this evidence of an "end-run," (not merely a
suit based on a publication), which the Court implied triggered First
Amendment scrutiny in Hustler. "7
Food Lion applied this "end-run" concept to newsgathering cases.
Even if the plaintiff sued for newsgathering conduct, FoodLion held that
if an "end-run" is detected, First Amendment scrutiny must be
applied."' First the Fourth Circuit noted that "Food Lion acknowledges
that it did not sue for defamation because its 'ability to bring an action
!11. See id.
112. See id at 56.
113. Id. at 55, n.3 (setting out the elements of the tort under Virginia law). See also
Cohen, 501 U.S. at 675 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting, in his discussion of Cohen,
that "[tihere was no doubt that Virginia's tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress was 'a law of general applicability' unrelated to the suppression of speech.").
114. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 672.
115. Seeid. at671.
116. Id. (expressly finding that Cohen was not seeking to evade the restrictions of
New York Times).
117. See id.
118. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522. Similarly, in Veilleux, one of the factors the
Court of Appeals weighed in assessing whether First Amendment standards should
apply was that "[uinlike Hustler and Food Lion this is not a case where [the plaintiff]
could avoid the strictures of a defamation claim by seeking 'defamation-type' damages
under an easier common law standard." Veilleux v. National Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92,
128 (lst Cir. 2000).
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for defamation . . required proof that ABC acted with actual
malice.""' 9 The court reiterated this point: "It is clear that Food Lion
was not prepared to offer proof meeting the New York Times standard
under any claim that it might assert."'"2
Based on this admission, the court concluded that Food Lion was
attempting an end-run: "What Food Lion sought to do, then, was to
recover defamation-type damages under non-reputational tort claims,
without satisfying the stricter (First Amendment) standards of a
defamation claim . . . such an end-run around First Amendment
strictures is foreclosed by Hustler."'2 Thus the Fourth Circuit in Food
Lion imposed First Amendment scrutiny because it detected an end-
run.'2
A. Detecting End-Runs
The problem is how do you detect an "end-run"? Here Food Lion
offers an interesting innovation. At first blush, the Supreme Court's
analysis in Hustler and Cohen calls for an inquiry into the subjective
motivation of the plaintiff."2 This inquiry into motive seems either
impossible or in danger of being easily evaded. A court can never know
what truly motivates a plaintiff (or more accurately her lawyers) in
selecting a cause of action. The only indicators of motivation that the
Supreme Court had before it in either Cohen or Hustler were the
pleadings, and at times it seems as if the Supreme Court simply
presumed that a plaintiff who also filed, but lost, a libel claim (Falwell,
for example) was really suing for libel. By contrast, Cohen, who had
never included a claim for libel, was not seeking an end-run. 24 If the
test is simply whether the lawsuit contains a failed libel count, then
good plaintiffs lawyers will simply not state a claim for libel so their
motives will never be called into question."2
119. Food Lion, 94 F.3d at 522.
120. Id.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. The consequences of detecting an end-run could vary. For instance, the Hustler
Court, having detected an end-run, applied New York Times to preclude any recovery,
whereas the Food Lion court allowed recovery, but disallowed certain damages (those
it saw as "defamation-type damages").
123. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671 (distinguishing Cohen and Hustler on the grounds
that Cohen was not "attempting to use a promissory estoppel cause of action to avoid
the strict requirements for establishing a libel [action]").
124. See id.
125. See Sims, supra note 65, at 555-56 (rejecting "anti-circumvention" as a useful
First Amendment principle because it remains "ill-defined and conceptually
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More problematic is that we do know what motivates attorneys in
selecting a cause of action. Attorneys state the causes of action which,
on the merits, give the best chance of recovery for their clients. Of
course plaintiffs seek an end-run around New York Times, because they
are otherwise highly likely to lose. 26 The test for. First Amendment
strictures cannot be whether the attorney is honest enough to admit (as
the lawyers did in Food Lion) 27 that they were seeking to sue for other
torts because they could not win in libel, or lie and pretend that an
action in libel had never occurred to them. If we are to take the end-run
test seriously, the focus on the plaintiffs motivation seems a weak
vehicle. 2 Indeed, one scholar has rejected the test concluding it was
too "ill-defined and conceptually troublesome" to be of use.'29
One way to read Food Lion is that it suggests a new way to detect
an end-run: the damages sought. New York Times bars recovery in
defamation actions without meeting First Amendment strictures. If a
plaintiff seeks "defamation-type damages,"'3 ° we "know" they really
wanted to sue in defamation, and thus are attempting an end-run. In this
light, the damages sought act as a "scarlet letter" revealing the true
nature of the plaintiffs suit regardless of the legal form it takes. If the
plaintiff seeks defamation-type damages, this scarlet letter alerts the
court to an attempted end-run. The Fourth Circuit put it this way:
"What Food Lion sought to do ...was to recover defamation-type
troublesome" and seemingly turns on whether "the pleadings present an obvious nexus
to defamation").
126. 1 am not suggesting that plaintiffs' attorneys pursue recovery without
consideration of the merits, but rather that they select the strongest of possible claims
open to their client.
127. The court ofappeals noted that in its appellate brief, "Food Lion acknowledges
that it did not sue for defamation because its 'ability to bring an action for defamation
... required proof that ABC acted with actual malice."' Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522.
In contrast, Professor Logan reports that Food Lion attempted to amend to add a
defamation claim after the statute of limitations had run, arguing that ABC's failure to
provide it with complete copies of the tapes had prevented it from initially pursuing
such a claim. See Logan, supra note 2, at 141.
128. See Sims, supra note 65, at 514 (characterizing the test as little more than an
inquiry into whether the "challenged speech. .. looks more like defamation").
129. Id. at 555-56.
130. As discussed more fully below, the Food Lion court (citing Cohen and Hustler)
indicated that reputational damages and emotional distress damages are "defamatory-
type damages." While it seems clear why reputational damages would be a good
indicator that recovery for libel is really being sought, it is not so clear why emotional
distress damages should also signal an attempt to evade New York Times. The Food Lion




damages under non-reputational tort claims, without satisfying the
stricter (First Amendment) standards of a defamation claim."''
The Food Lion court sees this distinction as explaining Hustler,
where the plaintiff was seeking emotional distress damages and the
Supreme Court applied First Amendment strictures; and Cohen, where
the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff was "not seeking damages
for injury to his reputation or his state of mind," and therefore rejected
the call for First Amendment protection.' Since the plaintiff in Food
Lion was "claiming reputational damages from publication," the Fourth
Circuit concluded it was seeking to "bypass the New York Times stan-
dard" thereby triggering First Amendment scrutiny.'33
Thus scrutiny is triggered if the plaintiff sues for a traditional
speech tort or seeks defamation-type damages (indicating an end-run). 34
The First Amendment strictures then step in and limit recovery,'35 and
the end-run is prevented.
B. Evaluating the "Traditional Speech Tort or End-Run" Trigger
This creative solution, suggested by FoodLion, is appealing. Food
Lion can sue for trespass and breach of duty of loyalty (or any other
newsgathering tort) without meeting the strictures-of New York Times,
but as soon as it seeks defamation-type damages for those torts an end-
run is suspected, and First Amendment restrictions are triggered. This
reading seems to accommodate the Supreme Court's conflicting desires:
the Court wants to protect publication yet still punish the media for
"everyday" torts committed in newsgathering.'36 The FoodLion decision
also seems to make sense of the conflict between the Court's holdings
in Cohen and Hustler (at least if we accept at face value the Court's
assertion that only the latter sought defamation-type damages creating
a suspicion of an end-run).
37
131. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 523 (quoting Cohen).
133. Id. at 523-24 (emphasis added).
134. One can read the trigger in a slightly different way--that either suspect motive
or defamation-type damage is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny.
135. As noted supra note 122, the consequences of detecting an end-run could be
to limit recovery or preclude it altogether.
136. See supra note 78 (discussing the Court's conflicting dicta on protection for
newsgathering). Neither of the approaches discussed in this article would recognize
such protection; rather each would impose First Amendment scrutiny on liability for
newsgathering only if certain damages were sought.
137. The Court in Cohen expressly concluded that it was not faced with a claim for
reputational damages. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671. As discussed infra note 172, I do
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The test also protects the media in a fairly concrete way because
it effectively disallows damages for reputation and emotional distress,'
unless some heightened First Amendment showing is made. These are
the hardest damages to quantify and the most likely to be the subject of
large jury awards. To illustrate, in Food Lion, the plaintiff recovered
only two dollars on its claims for breach of loyalty and trespass."" The
court of appeals refused to allow recovery of damages for loss of good
will, lost sales, and decrease in Food Lion's share value (estimated by
the plaintiffs to be in the billions), labeling these as reputation-based
damages, unless the plaintiff proved fault and falsity.'39
Finally, the "no end-runs" approach may have considerable appeal
to members of the Supreme Court. In the privacy area, the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to declare broad rules, preferring to proceed on
a case-by-case basis. 40 Similarly, some of the Justices seem committed
to the Court's decision in New York Times, but unwilling to expand it
into other areas.'4' The "end-run" approach safeguards New York Times,
without greatly expanding its reach. No new bright-line rules are
adopted; rather, the accepted First Amendment limits on libel cases are
simply extended to disguised libel cases. In sum, the court in FoodLion
has devised an approach which seems a clever and workable innovation
of the "no end-runs" trigger.
C. Complications Ahead
What damages act as a scarlet letter? In Food Lion the court only
had a claim for reputational damage before it." If any damages clearly
not think that this characterization is correct.
138. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522.
139. See supra notes 32-33.
140. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989) (eschewing reaching
the ultimate question of the constitutionality of the privacy tort and instead electing to
proceed on a case-by-case basis).
141. In particular, Chief Justice Rehnquist has frequently rejected additional
substantive and procedural protections on the ground that sufficient protection already
exists under New York Times. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21
(1990) (concluding that "[w]e are not persuaded that, in addition to these protections,
an additional separate constitutional privilege for 'opinion' is required to ensure the
freedom ofexpression guaranteed by the First Amendment"); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S.
783, 790 (1984) (noting that "the potential chill on protected First Amendment activity
stemming from libel and defamation actions is already taken into account in the
constitutional limitations on the substantive law governing such suits").
142. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 523 (concluding that "Food Lion, in seeking
compensation for matters such as loss of good will and lost sales, [was] claiming
reputational damages from publication...").
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tell us that the plaintiff is attempting an end-run around libel, then they
are reputational damages.
What about emotional distress damages? The Food Lion court did
not face this question because the plaintiff was a corporation, but to be
consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Hustler (where First
Amendment scrutiny was applied when plaintiff sought emotional
distress damages), the Food Lion court indicated that "defamation-type
damages" include emotional distress damages. 43 Yet, it is far from
evident why emotional distress damages are indicative of an attempt to
avoid the strictures imposed in libel cases.
Finally, I am not sure we would all agree about what constitutes
reputational damages. The Supreme Court in Cohen concluded that
Cohen's claims for lost wages and lowered earning capacity were not
damages for injuries to his reputation.'" Yet surely his earning capacity
as a political consultant was lowered precisely because the publication
gave him a reputation for using smear tactics and dirty tricks (or at least
a reputation for being sloppy enough to get caught). In FoodLion, the
court of appeals concluded that "matters such as loss of good will and
lost sales" are reputational damages for a corporation. 45 Yet lost sales
seem to be the corporate equivalent of lower earnings, which the Cohen
Court treated as non-reputational.
In sum, the Food Lion test of defamation-type damages as the
indicator of an end-run may have some complications. However, even
with these crinkles, it appears a far more workable test than the
subjective motivation test apparently used by the Supreme Court in
Cohen and Hustler.
V. A REVOLUTION IN DISGUISE: PUBLICATION DAMAGES AS A
UNIVERSAL TRIGGER
Perhaps the Fourth Circuit's announcement in Food Lion is more
revolutionary than has thus far been implied. We have read Food Lion
to refine the "libel or end-run" trigger: here, the defamation-type
143. The court labeled the damages variously as "publication damages," id. at 522,
as "defamation-type damages," id., and as "damages resulting from speech," id. at 523.
144. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671 (observing that "Cohen is not seeking damages for
injury to his reputation or his state of mind. He sought damages in excess of $50,000
for breach of a promise that caused him to lose his job and lowered his earning
capacity.").
145. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 523.
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damages tell the court that the cause of action was really libel seeking
to pass under another name. ;"
Now I want to suggest that Food Lion may be taking a more radical
and more interesting approach to the trigger: First Amendment scrutiny
is triggered by the damages sought." "Publication damages" are
important not because they serve as an indicium that the underlying
cause of action is libel, but because they themselves trigger First
Amendment scrutiny. 17 In this light, the ruling in Food Lion is about
publication damages-not about any particular tort. It suggests a
unifying constitutional principle for all actions against the media
precisely because it treats the cause of action filed as irrelevant. First
Amendment scrutiny is triggered if a plaintiff seeks damages based on
publication.
While this trigger is broad-it protects the media regardless of the
cause of action elected by the plaintiff-it is also narrow, because it
does not trigger First Amendment scrutiny for newsgathering per se.
Suits based on the media's activities while gathering the news only
undergo First Amendment scrutiny when publication damages are
sought.
A. Is This What the Food Lion Court Is Doing?
I do not mean to suggest that the Fourth Circuit articulated any such
broad new principle in Food Lion. But there are certain indicia that its
decision was not simply about detecting subterfuge defamation actions.
While the court did talk about "end-runs," there is far broader language
throughout the damages section of the opinion. 4 ' The holding it
146. 1 do not think that using damages as the trigger mandates that the resulting
First Amendment restrictions also be limitations on damages. Once damages trigger
First Amendment protection, we could employ any of the substantive, procedural,
and/or remedial limitations suggested at the outset of this paper, or indeed any of a
panoply of balancing tests that courts have enunciated in speech cases. The FoodLion
court, as I have noted before, presumes that the substantive element of actual malice
will be employed to bar recovery of publication damages.
147. To a certain extent the use of"publication damages" as a trigger is perhaps still
acting as a scarlet letter-what it is revealing is that the suit attempts to punish speech.
This is, after all, the activity protected by the First Amendment.
148. The Food Lion court dealt with the First Amendment twice. First, it asked
whether the First Amendment precludes liability, and concluded it does not. See Food
Lion, 194 F.3d at 520-22. Then the court turned to the second question of whether the
First Amendment precludes the plaintiff from recovering "publication damages," and
concluded it does. See id. In this part of this article, I focus on the court's language in
the damages section of its opinion.
The separation of the liability and damages issues may reflect the court's belief
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announced, and declared a settled First Amendment principle, is a rule
about limits on "publication damages:" "An overriding (and settled)
First Amendment principle precludes the award of publication damages
in this case."'49
Again it announced that "Food Lion could not bypass the New York
Times standard if it wanted publication damages,""'5 or, most broadly,
"when a public figure plaintiff uses a law to seek damages resulting
from speech covered by the First Amendment, the plaintiff must satisfy
the proof standard of New York Times."' 5' Let us explore how a "no
damages from publication without First Amendment scrutiny" rule
would work.
B. Application
To understand this theory, perhaps it is helpful to review how it
seemed to work in Food Lion. In its broadest sense, the rule means that
any damages flowing from the publication, rather than from the
allegedly wrongful conduct itself, would trigger First Amendment
scrutiny.' Thus, for the trespass tort, we could identify damages from
the trespass itself (classically loss of enjoyment of the land-here, the
Food Lion store) and those that flow from the publication of the film
shot during the trespass (a loss in profits and a dive in public opinion
after the program is aired). Under the Fourth Circuit's ruling the latter
are "publication damages," and cannot be recovered without triggering
First Amendment scrutiny.' The same result applies to the breach of
duty of loyalty claim: whereas the plaintiff can recover the damages
that the damage inquiry raises a separate First Amendment principle. However, the
court's bifurcated approach may simply reflect the fact that the issue of damages was
raised as a cross-appeal by Food Lion, and thus is discussed separately from the issues
appealed by ABC. See id. at 522.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 524 (emphasis added). If the court is simply suggesting a new litmus test
to detect an end-run around libel actions, then the key should be reputational damages,
since they show that the plaintiff "really wanted" to sue in libel. In contrast, the court
repeatedly uses the phrase "publication damages." This suggests that a broader
principle is being announced since it is hard to imagine that the presence of damages
flowing from publication are a good indicator that the lawsuit is really a disguised libel
action.
151. Id. at 523.
152. 1 will discuss how this principle fits with the Supreme Court's case law, in
particular Hustler and Cohen, infra notes 159-172.
153. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 521. Once again, it is worth noting that while the
Food Lion court elected the actual malice rule of New York Times, the nature of the First
Amendment standard is not the subject of this paper.
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flowing from the breach (here, perhaps, the wages paid to the disloyal
reporter-employees), if it seeks to recover for the harm caused to its
image or its share price by the publication of the information gathered
by the disloyal employees, First Amendment scrutiny is triggered.
Food Lion could sue and recover on any tort without First Amend-
ment scrutiny so long as the damages were based on the media's
behavior, not on the publication. However, if it sought publication
damages, that is, damages flowing from the publication, First Amend-
ment scrutiny would be triggered regardless of the name of the tort.
Any newsgathering tort is potentially subject to First Amendment
scrutiny."54
This new principle may even make First Amendment scrutiny
potentially applicable to all torts, and perhaps all contract and property
actions. For instance, if the media is sued for negligence when its truck
collides with a pedestrian, First Amendment scrutiny is not triggered.
In contrast, if the media is sued for negligence because a reader is
injured when the publisher's mushroom guidebook misidentifies a
poisonous mushroom as edible, First Amendment scrutiny must be
applied because the damages sought flow from the publication.' This
article will, however, focus on the ramifications of such a rule for
newsgathering actions.
C. But What are Publication Damages?
As I see it, the enigma presented by this rule, and indeed implicit
in the Food Lion case, is what are "publication damages?" To some
extent we can simply instruct the jury that they cannot award damages
based on the publication, only on the underlying conduct. However,
while leaving hard questions to the jury without any guidance may be
a habit of tort law, it hardly seems an optimal solution to this constitu-
tional dilemma.
I think that the inquiry should mirror the causation inquiry of tort
law. 5 Why not test for publication damages with a modified version
154. Another example would be suits for invasion of privacy by intrusion. If, for
instance, the media entered the plaintiff's home with cameras rolling as part of a media
ride-along, an action for intrusion would not trigger First Amendment scrutiny, unless
plaintiff sought publication damages from a later broadcast of the footage.
155. This example is loosely based on Winterv. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033
(9th Cir. 1991). See MARc A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 424-58 (5th ed. 1995), for other examples of negligence,
products liability, and fraud cases based on publication.
156. I propose a First Amendment test resembling the cause-in-fact inquiry of tort
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of that old favorite, the "but for" test? If the damages claimed would
not have occurred "but for" publication, the damages are "publication
damages," and First Amendment scrutiny is triggered. If the damage
would have occurred without the publication, then publication damages
are not at issue.' Thus, in Food Lion, the damages of lost employee
time (while the reporters were filming) are not publication damages
because they occur regardless of whether publication ever occurs; in
contrast, the drop in stock value is a publication damage because it
would not have occurred but for the publication. Thus, whenever
publication is a "but for" cause of the damages, we have "publication
damages.'"' s
D. Does Such a Damages Rule Fit with Supreme Court Precedent?
Does this new damages principle have any support in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence? I would suggest that it does. First, while it is
possible to read New York Times as simply about limiting recovery in
libel actions, the reason the Court gave for applying First Amendment
restrictions to libel was to prevent chilling speech." 9 The New York
Times Court refused to allow recovery simply upon proof of common
law libel because of the effect of such awards on the media."6 Compar-
ing libel to sedition, it noted: "The fear of damage awards under
[common law] may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of
law. The common law doctrine of proximate cause could also limit damage awards in
some cases. In fact, the district court in Food Lion ultimately rejected the award of
publication damages based on proximate cause. See Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 522
(holding that Food Lion's claims for loss of good will, lost sales, and diminished share
value "were the direct result of diminished consumer confidence in the store," and that
this lack of confidence was not proximately caused by the tortious conduct proven, but
by the accurate report of Food Lion's food handling practices themselves.) See also
Logan, supra note 2 at 210-20 (arguing that common law principles can be used to limit
damage awards without the need to resort to First Amendment limitations).
157. 1 will discuss how this proposed rule fits with the Supreme Court's case law,
in particular Hustler and Cohen, infra notes 159-172.
158. Publication only needs to be a "but for" cause, not the only "but for" cause. For
instance, in Food Lion, the decline in stock value would not have occurred "but for"
publication, and would not have occurred "but for" the trespass (since without it there
was no film to broadcast). But the presence of other "but for" causes (here, the
trespass) is irrelevant. First Amendment scrutiny is triggered so long as publication is
a "but for" cause of the claimed harm.
159. Indeed, the Court in New York Times spent little time discussing reputation. But
see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) ( discussing reputational
interests extensively).
160. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 277.
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prosecution under a criminal statute."16' Newspapers might either fail
to survive such judgments or cease to voice public criticism for fear of
liability. New York Times is about the dangers of self censorship flowing
from high damage awards. 1
6 2
From this perspective, it is irrelevant what interest plaintiff seeks
to vindicate or what cause of action it elects-sedition, libel, reputation,
privacy, or the sanctity of land. The chill from publication damages is
the same regardless of the injury plaintiff alleges or the route selected. 63
My thesis is that any award of damages flowing from publication can
chill publication, and that publication-based damages should therefore
always be constitutionally suspect.
As an aside, I am not suggesting that the harm suffered by the
plaintiff is irrelevant to First Amendment analysis, but rather that it
should be irrelevant to whether First Amendment scrutiny is triggered.
Most First Amendment protection is about balancing, and it may be that
privacy, for instance, has a stronger claim to protection than reputation.
But this should not be relevant to the initial issue of whether to even
engage in First Amendment scrutiny. This must focus on speech, not
the plaintiff's claimed injury.
The "no publication damages without First Amendment scrutiny"
rule has some support in the language of the Supreme Court's cases.
For instance, in Hustler, the Court repeatedly emphasized that its goal
was to protect publications, and to minimize the chilling effect the award
of damages for a publication would create.'64 The ruling, the Court
emphasized, "reflects our considered judgment that such a standard is




162. See Logan, supra note 2, at 1165 (observing that the Court was especially
troubled by the power ofjuries to award huge damages).
163. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 675 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (commenting, "I
perceive no meaningful distinction between a statute that penalizes published speech
in order to protect the individual's psychological well being or reputational interest and
one that exacts the same penalty in order to compensate the loss of employment or
earning potential. Certainly, our decision in Hustler recognized no such distinction.").
164. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 46-57. The Court held that "public figures and public
officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by
reason ofpublications." Id. at 56 (emphasis added). The Court also concluded that "for
reasons heretofore stated this claim cannot, consistently with the First Amendment,
form a basis for the award of damages when the conduct in question is the publication of
a caricature such as the ad parody involved here." Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 56.
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The "no publication damages without First Amendment scrutiny"
rule also accounts for the Supreme Court's decisions. All the speech
torts (libel, publication of private facts, false light) that inherently seek
publication damages are subject to First Amendment scrutiny. The non-
speech tort cases also seem to reflect this rule. In Hustler (a non-speech
tort case), the basis of the award of damages was defendant's "publica-
tion of a caricature."'" In such instances, First Amendment scrutiny
should apply, and was applied by the Hustler Court.
The principle could also explain the Court's repeated refusal to
announce any protection for torts the media commits while gathering
news. 67 As long as no publication damages are sought, no scrutiny is
triggered, and the media (as noted by Justice White in Cohen) is subject
to liability if they "break and enter into an office or dwelling to gather
news."'' 6  Cohen's declaration that "generally applicable laws do not
offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against
the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the
news" can be read as a distinction between causes of action where the
plaintiff seeks non-publication damages having an "incidental effect" on
the media's ability to gather the news; 69 and where the plaintiff seeks
publication damages having a "direct effect" on the media's ability to
communicate.
This principle also explains Cohen, at least if we take the Supreme
Court at its word that Cohen is not an action where the plaintiff sought
damages flowing from the publication, but rather from other conduct.
In Cohen, the Court noted that
[Cohen] sought damages in excess of $50,000 for breach of a promise
that caused him to lose his job and lowered his earning capacity.
Thus, this is not a case like Hustler . . . , where we held that the
constitutional libel standards apply to a claim alleging that the
publication of a parody was a state-law tort .... 170
Thus if we agree with the Court that the damages in Cohen were not
based on publication, it was correct to refuse to apply First Amendment
scrutiny.
The problem in Cohen is that the loss of ajob and a lowered earning
capacity look to me like publication damages. "But for" the publication
166. Id. at 57.
167. See supra note 78.
168. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 671.
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of the article (which identified Cohen as engaged in smear tactics), he
would not have lost his job and others would not have been skeptical
about hiring him. His lost job and lowered earning capacity should, I
think, have been classified as publication damages, and First Amend-
ment scrutiny should have been triggered.'" Thus, while Cohen is
consistent if we agree with the Court's characterization of the damages,
I think the result in Cohen is wrong because the majority erred in
holding that the plaintiff was not seeking publication damages."
E. Implications for Existing Law of the "No Publication Damages
Without First Amendment Scrutiny" Rule
On one level, the implications of adopting a "no publication
damages without First Amendment scrutiny" rule are easily predicted.
It will stop the guessing game about which causes of actions are subject
to First Amendment scrutiny-we will have a unified trigger regardless
of the name of the action at issue." Whether the claim is for trespass,
fraud, breach of duty of loyalty, privacy, negligence, or any other tort,
is irrelevant; the key inquiry will be whether publication damages are
sought-if so, First Amendment scrutiny is mandated.
However, while the trigger may be clear, the possible First
Amendment protections flowing from its activation are numerous, and
ultimately, beyond the scope of this paper. As I suggested in Section II,
some of the options include substantive requirements (such as the fault
and falsity requirement of New York Times); procedural reforms (such as
Bose's appellate review); and limitations on remedies (most probably on
damages).
The impact on current law of the adoption of a "publication
damages trigger" will differ radically depending on the nature of the
protection it is held to trigger. For instance, if seeking "publication
damages" always triggers a requirement that the plaintiff prove falsity
171. Cohen may be a unique fact scenario. Because the promise involved an
agreement not to publish, the breach was publication. If the newspaper had promised
anything else-for instance in Food Lion the implied promise by reporters to be loyal
employees-we can distinguish between the damages from the breach and damages
from publication itself.
172. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 675-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (observing that "the
publication of important political speech is the claimed violation. Thus, as in Hustler,
the law may not be enforced to punish the expression of truthful information or
opinion.").
173. There will, of course, be debate about what constitutes publication damages.
See supra notes 156-158.
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(as in New York Times), 4 such a standard guarantees that the media will
never pay "publication damages" if they publish the truth. In contrast,
if claims for "publication damages" only trigger a limit on the remedy
available, then obviously the impact on current law would be far more
minor.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, I have nothing but praise for the Fourth Circuit's opinion
in Food Lion. At a minimum, it suggests a way to make the Court's
"libel or end-run" test workable by suggesting that "defamation-type
damages" are a useful indicator of an end-run. This analysis, based on
an analogy to libel cases, will, I think, find favor with the Supreme
Court.
In the alternative, the Food Lion opinion may point the way to a
more radical and innovative approach to dealing with media liability.
By calling on us to remember that in New York Times, the Court's fear
was that damages can chill publication, it may be the first step away
from a jurisprudence erroneously focused on which cause of action
plaintiff elects and toward an analysis founded on damages sought.
174. One advantage of using a "publication damages" rule is that it makes New York
Times easy to apply. Instead of the disjunction that can occur when you try to apply
New York Times to non-speech torts directly, the publication damages rule bydefinition
is only triggered when there is a publication. There must be a publication, or the
plaintiff cannot seek publication damages. Then the strictures of New York Times, which
require a false publication made with fault, will make sense.
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